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ON THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
OF PRESENT TENSES*
Sobre a Semântica e a Pragmática
dos Tempos no Presente
Cláudio C. C. Gonçalves**
INTRODUCTION
The semantics of tense and aspect has enjoyed ever growing atten-
tion since the 1970’s.  Nevertheless, a principled, comprehensive account of
the interpretation of the present tense of European languages, such as the
examples given in (1) is still presents challenges.
 (1) a. O João nada. (Portuguese)
b. Juan nada.  (Spanish)
c. Jean nage. (French)
d. Gianni nuota. (Italian)
e. Johan schwimmt (German)
f. John swims. (English)
* For helpful comments and discussions on these deviant ideas I would like to thank
the Werner Abraham, Karina Molsing, Roberta Pires de Oliveira, Luiz Arthur Pagani, Paul Pietroski,
Luisândro Mendes Souza. None of which are to be held liable for any of which follows. Also the
public at the the 2005 WLT USP, at the 2005 GEL where I presented part of this material and the
Revista Letras referees.
* * Doutorando, UFSC.
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Ignoring for the while effects that arise if we change swim in (1)
for verbs of different Aktionsarten, present simple verbs alternate at least
these values in the languages listed in (1):
· They are interpretable as sentences describing habits.1 Or, in the
case where the subject is a bare noun as in fish swim, a generic.
In languages as German and French the simple present form can
also be interpreted as a progressive, whereby (1 c) or (1 e) may
be interpreted as reporting a fact which is going on concomitant
to the utterance of the sentence. The conditions for the availabi-
lity of that reading are not the same in the two languages, but
for now what matters is acknowledging the possibility.
· A futurate reading is available for simple present cross-linguis-
tically, although its conditions vary from language to language.
· Somewhat more restricted in frequency, but still universally avai-
lable throughout natural languages, are what I call here the
narrative uses of simple present. They can be divided into two
sorts best known as sportscaster style and historical present.
The sportscaster style narrates a sequence of events each one
roughly concomitant to the time of utterance of the sentence which
reports it. The historical present narrates a sequence of events
in the past.
With so many readings available, the challenge is to know their
nature and to propose a semantics for the simple present that at least rema-
ins compatible with the phenomena listed above. And also, to give an ac-
count of how they arise cross-linguistically in an empirically interesting
way. In what follows I will venture a hypothesis for treating simple presents
non-reportively. It will focus on attributing a semantic representation for
present which is compatible with habituality, and on proposing a semantics-
pragmatics interface that accounts for how that value and the reportive sports-
caster values arise.  The historical present and the futurate values will not
be taken up. Also, the main focus will be in Portuguese and English, with
only occasional notes about the other languages. I assume the core issues
are the same for all theses languages, but for reasons of space will not deal
with the issues here.
1 A note of caution about terminology. I will not attempt to be fully precise about
terms such as habitual, generic, dispositional and their exact relation with neighbouring concepts
such as perfectivity and imperfectivity. I hope to have used them intuitively, clearly and coherently
enough throughout.
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The paper is divided as follows. Section 1 has an overview of
treatment of present simple with reportive definitions within approaches
which stemmed from Montague Semantics in the 70’s, especially DRT. Noti-
ce that although DRT will be used as a representational format here, that
does not imply much about the hypotheses that will be defended. The issues
we will be interested are assumed throughout the literature. Sections 2 and
3 propose a non-reportive characterisation of the semantics of present sim-
ples, as a means of avoiding the problems that arise from using the ontolo-
gy of eventualities to characterise simple present tenses. By the end of secti-
on 3 we will have DRSs for sentences with present simples which are compa-
tible with reportive or non-reportive readings, thus in section 4 it will be
argued that Gricean principles as explored by Blutner (2000) can account for
how those readings  arise.
THE SEMANTICS OF PRESENT SIMPLE IN FORMAL SEMANTICS
Despite the ambiguity noted above, the semantics of present sim-
ple tenses is standardly defined reportively, i.e. saying that the eventuality
is true at the utterance time, as can be seen from Bennet and Partee (1978).
Thus, the sentence John swims is seen as true if at the utterance time it is
true that John swims. That means that the semantics of simple present is
something like the sportscaster style, which is a highly marked kind of use.
The more common non-reportive reading is arrived at by semantic operati-
ons over the artificial reportive meaning considered to be the default (even
in terms of language acquisition). Another key ingredient in the analysis of
the temporal-aspectual property of tenses is assuming events, following the
seminal Davidson (1967) and developments such as Bach (1986). With that
move come the following two ontological assumptions about the relation of
types of eventualities and their relations with time intervals: (i) events are
included in the time in which they are claimed to hold; (ii) states overflow
the time for which they are claimed to hold.
In a DRS representation the relation between events and time inter-
vals appears as the condition [e ⊆ t]. The condition for states appears as [t ⊆
s]. These are independent from the tense of the verb. Observe their results
when interacting with tense: to the left of the arrows, the conditions that a
sentence in the past, future or present tense contributes to the DRS it embeds
in. To the right of the arrow we see some necessary consequences of those
conditions.
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(2)  a. past: [t<n, e ⊆ t] ⇒ e < n.
      b. future: [t>n, e ⊆ t] ⇒ e>n.
      c. present: [t = n, e ⊆ t] ⇒ *e ⊆ n.
      d. present: [t = n, t ⊆ s] ⇒  n ⊆ s.
The consequences for past and future are uncontroversial enough.
Not so for the present, there is a problem in (2 c). The consequence e ⊆ n
follows from the reportive tense definition [t = n] and the assumption that
events are included in their location time [e ⊆ t]. According to this, if an
utterance of John swims is to be truthful, the described eventuality of John’s
swimming has to occur completely within the time of the utterance. In other
words, [t = n, e ⊆ t] gives that the meaning of simple present is the sports-
caster style. Since an [e ⊆ n]  reading of John swims is very far from the
intuitive reading of that sentence, it needs to be banned.
As R, R & K (2005, p. 57) point out that ban is not without its
motivation. In the background of all that has been said so far lies an as-
sumption of temporal staticity of discourse: it is assumed that nothing of
importance to a discourse changes while it is in progress. But after banning
*[e ⊆ n], what will we substitute it with? Using the motivation just mentio-
ned K&R (1993, p. 536) correctly claim that we want to interpret simple
present according to principle (3):
(3) The eventuality described by a present tense sentence must
properly include the utterance time.
The principle (3) amounts to saying that we want simple present
to introduce a condition [n ⊆ e] in the DRS. There are two important conse-
quences. First, the present tense will be predicted to have stative properti-
es, since the eventualities it denotes overflow the time for which they are
claimed, just as states do. Second, since the reportive view ([t = n]) and
the ontological assumption on the relation between events and temporal
intervals ([e ⊆ n]) don’t add up to the condition [n ⊆ e], we must posit that
the interpretation of simple present with event verbs is arrived at by the
interference of some other factor, i.e., a silent operator. The approach here
aims at dispensing with those operators by giving present simple tense a
non-reportive definition.
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TOWARDS A NON-REPORTIVE DEFINITION OF SIMPLE PRESENT
The previous section showed that the reportive view of verb tenses
and the ontological commitment concerning the existence of states and events
and their relation with time intervals are cornerstones of the standard analy-
sis of the temporal-aspectual properties of verbs in natural languages.
This section will propose an underspecification view of the seman-
tics of verbs, where they are analysed as non-reportive. Their semantic con-
tent will be characterised without appeal to the [e ⊆ t] and [t ⊆ s] conditions
for events and states, respectively. Note, however, that the ontological com-
mitment in those conditions  will not be questioned, it simply will not be used.
The first step is to capture the conditions in which simple present
sentences felicitously introduce an eventuality into the conversational ba-
ckground. The notion of background brings us close to the notion of presu-
pposition. That is the desired effect. The treatment that comes out from using
the conversational background to characterise present tenses is consonant
to that spirit, as I will show in the next sections. What we want to find using
the common background is some regularity in the felicity conditions of pre-
sent tense sentences when used with its most natural meaning, the non-
reportive. Is that possible?
In fact there is a regularity concerning that which is already quite
well-known (see, for example, Smith, 1991), (i) activity and state verbs in
the simple present are felicitous when interpreted non-reportively; (ii) while
accomplishment and achievement verbs in the simple present are infelici-
tous when interpreted non-reportively.
We can see that by constituting a scenario where interlocutors A
and B are talking about Fred. Suppose interlocutor A knows only that Fred
is a male adult who is a friend of B’s. Whereas B knows many things about
Fred, just as he knows that his interlocutor A does not know those things.
We want to verify that in an exchange of the type (4), a sentence X can
felicitously instantiate a property to Fred considering A’s minimal background.
(4) A: Me fala do João. /Tell me something about John.
B: X
(5) a. O João fuma / John smokes.  (activity)
b. ? O João alcança o cume do Aconcágua. / John reaches
the peak of the Aconcagua. (achievement)
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c. ? O João descobre a América. /? John discovers America.
(achievement)
d. ? O João constrói uma casa. / ? John builds a house.
(accomplishment)
e. ? O João come a maçã. / ? John eats the apple. (accom-
plishment)
f. O João detesta a Maria. / John hates Mary. (state)
g. O João mora na Índia. / John lives in India. (state)
The result of this test, which is no news, can be seen in (5) for
Brazilian Portuguese and English. States and Activities are felicitous in the
nonreportive interpretation of simple present sentences. Accomplishments
and achievements aren’t.
Notice that the results are identical for English and for Brazilian
Portuguese. It seems that they could be extended to Spanish and Italian. And
to French and German as well if we are careful enough to exclude the pro-
gressive interpretation as will be mentioned in the next section.
Recall that the point of testing the felicity conditions of present
tense sentences was to arrive at a principle of interpretation of present tense
sentences without relying on the assumptions about the relation of eventua-
lities to the time in which they happen/hold. Thus using the sentences of (5)
in the context of (4) gives us the well-known fact that states and activities
are felicitous in the non-reportive present tense, while accomplishments and
achievements are not.
As we saw in (5), felicitous simple present sentences have verbs
that are either activities, or states in their Aktionsart. Accomplishments are
also acceptable if read as non-telic, but in such cases they are reputed to be
activities semantically.  So we can say that felicitous simple present senten-
ces denote an eventuality which overflows the utterance time.
AKTIONSARTEN CHARACTERISED AS (ABSENCE OF) CULMINATION POINT
I will argue now that with that we can characterise the regularity
discussed in the previous section by using the Aktionsarten to motivate the
interpretation principle (3). And that if we analyse the Aktionsarten in the
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terms of the conceptual structure of eventualites proposed by Moens e Stee-
dman (1987, p. 4), we can use the notion of change to interpret present
tenses. Using the notion of change is what will permit us to avoid the use of
event or state in the characterisation.
Moens e Steedman proposed that events have the structure depic-
ted in (6), where CP is the culmination point of the process, i.e., where the
process reaches its result.
(6)
preparatory process       CP            resultant state
The only ontological assumption the nucleus structure requires
us to bring into the characterisation is a notion of change. It can be charac-
terised as the point where change occurs: the culmination, where that action
ceases and the result of the event obtains.
With (6), the Aktionsarten can be characterised in terms of having or
not a CP and a preparatory process, as shown schematically in (7)  (where x, y z
are variables for sub-intervals such that x is earlier than y and z is earlier than z).
(8) a. states :  [¬PREP_PROC(x) ∧  ¬CP(y) ]
b. activities : [PREP_PROC(x) ∧  ¬CP(y) ]
c. accomplishments : [PREP_PROC(x) ∧  CP(y) ]
d. achievements : [¬PREP_PROC(x) ∧  CP(y) ]
By characterising the Aktionsarten as in (8) gives us that what
sets activities/states apart from achievements/accomplishments is having
or not a Culmination Point. Activities and State lack Culmination Points.
Thus we can say that sentences (5) in the context of (4) are felicitous if they
lack a CP (culmination point).
Since the reading on which this regularity was obtained is the non-
reportive reading, we are free to posit that simple present introduces condition
[n ⊂ t] in the DRS, instead of the more frequently claimed [t = n]. This would
amount to changing the CR.S’ of K&R (1993, p. 610) from (9 b) to (9 a):2
2 This is actually a simplification. The substitution of TPpt (Temporal Perspective
point) for n has been taken for granted. The rule for that substitution as the triggering configuration
can be found in K&R (1993, p. 610).
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(9) a. If the Tense of the verb is  present then introduce CONDI-
TIONSK
[n ⊂ t] in the DRS.
b. If the Tense of the verb is present then introduce  CONDI-
TIONSK
[n = t] in the DRS.
The most important feature of (9) is that it allows the repetition of
the eventuality within the interval whose existence is asserted. So by posi-
ting it as the Construction Rule for simple present, we meet the principle (3)
for interpretation for that tense from K&R (1993). Standardly the Constructi-
on Rule would be (9 b), which is reportive, and a generic/habitual operator
would be posited to meet principle (3). R, R&K (2005) has the details of how
things would go about in the lines of (9 b).
Since, as mentioned, the adequateness of the assumption that events
are included in their location time was never questioned, the DRS for simple
present will still feature the condition [e ⊆ t]. Thus there are two conditions
relevant to temporal interpretation [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t]. Together they say that
somewhere within an arbitrarily long interval (t) which properly includes
the utterance time (n) there was at least one piece of evidence that supports
the existence of events of swimming by John throughout the interval. It says
nothing else about those events in their relation to the utterance time. The
DRS by Construction Rule (9 a) is (10 a); whereas DRS (10 b) is the standard
one by (9 b).
(10) a. [n,  j,  t,  s,  x: John(j) & (n ⊂ t) & (e ⊆ t) e1:‘swim’(j)]
b. [n, j, t, s, x: John(j) & (n = t) & (e ⊆ t) & s1 : ‘swim’(j)]
In the next section we will see how the value of the sentences become
further specified with the [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t] such that habituality and the sportscaster
style are derived and also the intuitive entailment conditions hold between these
readings.
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HOW THE READINGS OF PRESENT TENSE ARISE
Due to its loosely specified nature with [n ⊂ t], the DRS for present
tense is compatible with conditions to any of these effects:  (i) the eventuali-
ty/ies preceding the u.t.; (ii) the eventuality/ies overlapping with the u.t.;
(iii) the eventuality/ies being posterior to the u.t.. This section shows that
independently motivated principles assumed in  bi-directional OT Semantics
can correctly supply conditions (ii) once the [n ⊂ t] condition is assumed for
present tense. Also, the Gricean maxims in the OT framework will permit us
to yield the habitual reading as coming from [n ⊂ t]: a plural occurrence of
eventualities will be presumed to occur in the interval by a principle of
informativeness. Since (i) and (iii) correspond to the past and the futurate
interpretations we will not take them at issue.
Bi-directional OT Semantics aims at bringing together the tradition
of Radical Pragmatics and Optimality Theory. Blutner (2000) argues for an
optimality-theoretic framework which captures Gricean maxims and balan-
ces informativeness and efficiency in natural language processing. Gricean
maxims are formulated as the I-principle, which is the speaker’s perspective
of comparing different syntactic expressions to convey the meaning inten-
ded; and the Q-principle, the hearer’s perspective comparing alternative syn-
tactic candidates for a certain meaning. The principles are a metric for opti-
mality and appear as the constraints Avoid Accommodation and Be Strong.
Where Be Strong captures the speaker’s goal of being informative and strength
is based on entailment relations. And Avoid Accomodation is a blocking
mechanism as a counterbalance of the demands of the Be Strong. By defini-
tion (11 b), the result of optimization under one perspective have influence
in structures that compete in the other perspective.
(11) a. Q-principle: Say as much as you can (given I)
I-principle: Say no more than you must (given Q)
b.   bidirectional OT (weak version)
(Q) [<A, τ> satisfies the Q principle iff <A, τ> ∈ Gene-
rator and there is no other pair <A’, τ> satisfying
the I-principle such that <A’, τ> is less costly than
<A, τ>;
(I) [<A, τ> satisfies the I principle iff <A, τ> ∈ Gene-
rator and there is no other pair <A’, τ> satisfying
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the Q principle such that <A’, τ> is less costly than
<A, τ>;
<A, τ> is called super-optimal iff it satisfies both
the Q- principle and the I-principle.
(12) a. AvoidAccommodation: it counts the number of discourse
markers that are involved in accommodation.
b. BeStrong: it evaluates pairs of form and context <A, τ>
with stronger outputs τ higher than pairs with weaker
ones.
c.  Constraint Ranking:   AvoidA >> BeStrong
HOW THE READINGS ARISE WITH OT SEMANTICS
As said in the opening section, the main problem of simple present
is to account for the multiple types of situations which it can be used in. So,
what cases exactly do we have to give an explanation for such that their
solutions take care of all the others?
With the conditions [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t], the resulting DRS is tantamount
to saying that Fred belongs to the set of swimmers for the interval t. The
approach leaves us under-informed with respect to details such as does he
belong to the group of swimmers because he swam once? twice? regularly
during the interval (say, twice a week for a whole decade)? Did he swim only
when it was needed?
Before taking up the issue of how and to which extent such details
should be specified, an observation has to be made about evidentiality of
simple present in their habitual use. Recall that the reportive view of simple
present characterises them as [n = t]. The ‘=’ is a deictic element in the
definition: it anchors the event to the utterance time n as can be seen from (2
c). That means that the evidence for uttering Fred swims with the [n = t]
definition is the deictic identification of the eventuality at the utterance time.
As has been underscored, (2 c) renders the sportscaster style of simple pre-
sent and has to be blocked to render its habitual use.In the sportscaster style
then the question of what counts as evidence for the uttering of a simple
present sentence is very clear. The same cannot be said about the habitual
use. What counts as evidence to say that someone swims (in the habitual
sense)?
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Let’s consider the hypothesis of it being deictic identification of the
eventuality at utterance time. This is reasonable for, in unmarked circums-
tances, if you see Fred swimming right before your eyes you can truthfully
and felicitously utter Fred swims.3
But it is not enough and eventually the following problem will
have to be dealt with. The circumstances can easily take one to say Fred is
swimming but he doesn’t swim if it is understood as Fred is swimming
now but he doesn’t swim usually. For example, suppose Fred hates water
and he had made bet where if he lost he would have to swim and the senten-
ce is uttered as he is paying the bet. A proposal for simple present has to
work around that problem somehow. In the theory proposed here that solu-
tion will come when the I and Q principles interact with the conditions intro-
duced by the simple present.
For the moment, the key point is to notice that since the [n ⊂ t]
definition has no deictic element, there is no need to say that the evidence for
uttering a simple present sentence is deictic identification at utterance time.
The [n ⊂ t] suggests that much weaker evidence can licence Fred swims. We
will standardly assume that it can be any evidence which the utterer accepts
as enough. That assumption has an important consequence. The First it that
to licence the habitual use of simple present any acceptable piece of eviden-
ce will have equal weight to any other, no matter how strong or weak they
are in intuitive terms. Consider these three pieces of evidence:
(13) a.  Overhearing Fred say that he owns goggles;
b.  Reading in the paper that Fred is a swimming gold-meda-
list;
c.  Seeing Fred swim;
Despite the difference in their intuitive strength, they licence the
sentence Fred swims just the same. So the deictic situation of seeing Fred
swim is not stronger than the other more indirect pieces of evidence.
Despite its obviousness, that first consequence invites a second
one which is crucial: just as there is no ranking amongst the types of eviden-
ce, there is also no ranking amongst where in the interval they occur. In
3 The fact that it is the same kind of evidence that licences the reportive use need
not bother us: choosing between wanting to convey the reportive meaning or the non-reportive one
is an aspect of the conversational agent’s behaviour that this approach does not aim at capturing.
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particular, evidence that occurs concomitant to utterance time has the same
weight as evidence that occurs in other points in the interval t. In languages
like English and BP which have a concurrent grammatical form to express
progress, it doesn’t matter if the evidence is concomitant to utterance time.
As will be commented, in languages like German and French which lack
those forms it happens differently. But the issue cannot be dealt with here for
reasons of space.
So far we have captured one element of the habitual meaning of
Fred swims: that it allows a number of occurrences of the swimming event
to be placed at any point in the relevant interval such that there may or may
not be coincidence with the utterance time n. However, the conditions [n ⊂ t;
e ⊆ t] do not capture another important element of the habitual reading.
There is still the need to account systematically for when there are many
occurrences of the event within the interval and when there is only one oc-
currence.
That involves specifying what licences the readings of simple pre-
sent as many eventualities within the interval and what licences single even-
tuality readings. In other words, the task is to set the habitual use as in (4)
apart from the sportscaster style use.  To do that, we have to account for the
three following types of cases:
· Case 1: The conversational agent (call him Agent A) who utters
Fred swims does so to supply his interlocutor (Agent B) with
more information about Fred. This is basically the context of (9)
which we considered in the previous section.
· Case 2: Suppose the sentence Fred swims is uttered by the sea as
a reaction to Fred having jumped in the water one moment earli-
er. Such that Agent A utters it while Fred is in the water and
swimming.
· Case 3: Suppose a context like that of Case 2. Plus suppose that
at least one of the Agents had assumed that Fred had never swam
in his life (and thus was not able to).
In Case 1, we have to say something about allowing or excluding
the possibility of the event happening once only. On the one hand, we want to
exclude that possibility: if a person swims once only within a long period of
time, we normally will not say (s)he swims holds for her/him (this is especi-
ally clear with respect to smoking: (s)he smokes does not hold for one who
tried a cigarette once as a teenager and never touched another ever since
then). On the other hand, we – at the risk of inconsistency – want to say also
that it is possible for the eventuality to have occurred only once. Suppose
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that Fred knows in theory how to swim, but that he had never done it except
for one time when he saved someone from drowning. With such (perfectly
plausible) backstories Fred swims would be undoubtly felicitous despite his
having done it only once. So we have reasons both for and against excluding
the possibility of the event happening only once. Case 3 will provide the
necessary clues to decide how to deal with this problem, showing that it lies
in the presuppositions the conversational agents have.
For Case 2, given [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t], the task is to exclude that what is
being referred to is the event being witnessed. For languages like English
and BP, which have a grammaticalised be –ing forms to convey progressive,
sentences such as Fred swims are infelicitous to describe the activity Fred is
engaged in at utterance time. For contexts like Case 2, present tense senten-
ces will typically be used in the sense of Fred is in the habit of swimming or
Fred is able to swim.
As for Case 3, if seeing Fred swim is enough for the agents to re-
evaluate their assumptions and conclude that they had been wrong, then
Case 3 becomes just like Case 2: the sentence Fred swims would have been
uttered without the negative assumption about Fred’s swimming abilities.
But re-evaluation need not occur. Suppose it doesn’t. That is, suppose that
despite seeing Fred swim the agents still maintain that he had never swum
before nor did he have the ability to until the moment he jumped in the
water. The sentence Fred swims will still be felicitous in that case. But how
can it be felicitous if, due to the assumptions of the conversational agents,
there is only one swimming event to be referred to and no super-interval for
the swimming to be inserted in? The bare [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t] conditions cannot
capture that: they require the agents to believe that the eventuality could
have occurred in other moments.
Another ramification of Case 3 brings yet more problems. Suppose
Fred’s one and only swim happened yesterday and that the agents not only
did not change their negative assumptions but also that they believe that
Fred will never swim again nor have the ability to. Somewhat surprisingly,
this ramification of Case 3 would make Fred swims infelicitous (even if
reportively since the swim happened previous to the utterance time).
It now has to be shown that the I-principle, the Q-principle and the
constraints AvoidAccomodation and BeStrong can account for the habitual
readings in those Cases and for the entailment relations between the compe-
ting sentences.  By looking at Cases 1 and 2 together it is clear that simple
present does not accept that the witnessed event be referred to. The problem
Case 3 can also accept that solution once it is taken into account that it
involves previous assumptions.
GONÇALVES, C. C. C. ON THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF PRESENT TENSES
186 REVISTA LETRAS, CURITIBA, N. 69, P. 173-190, MAIO/AGO. 2006. EDITORA UFPR.
 ACCOUNTING FOR THE 3 CASES
For Case 1 we have to say how the present conditions [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t]
arrive at expressing habituality. And show that, to arrive at the marked
reportive reading, presuppositions would have to be accommodated making
the reportive reading be predicted as more costly.
The speaker’s perspective is trivial for this Case. (S)He wants to
convey that, in the interval which the utterance time is a part, Fred swam a
certain amount of times perhaps with regular frequency. The proposed, non-
reportive, conditions for simple present will give him the strongest possible
result given what (s)he wants to convey. From the hearer’s perspective, upon
hearing Fred swims and not seeing Fred nor any sign of him swimming at
the utterance time (as had been specified for this scenario), (s)he will prefer
the habitual interpretation over the reportive or the progressive (the assump-
tion that the speaker is truthful is as good evidence as any). On the other
hand, for her/him to hear Fred swim and interpret it reportively or as a
progressive in this scenario (s)he would have to assume that the event was
concomitant to the utterance time (i.e. accommodate presuppositions to that
effect) thus those interpretations would also come out more costly.
Now, recall Case 2. At uttering Fred swims the speaker A wants to
convey the idea that Fred is in the habit of swimming as in Case 1. The event
of Fred swimming at utterance time that A is witnessing is enough evidence
for the habituality. If speaker A wants to be maximally informative with
respect to this context and to her/his communicative intentions, the alterna-
tive would be to use the Progressive sentence Fred is swimming. However,
on any account, it would refer to the swimming event witnessed during
utterance time. So to use the be - ing in this situation wanting to convey a
habituality (s)he would have to undo the presupposition that had been sup-
plied extra-linguistically by the direct witnessing of the event. Thus, given
habituality is what (s)he wants to convey and that the swimming is being
witnessed, the be – ing would be more costly.
Suppose agent B, the hearer, has just heard Agent A utter Fred
swims. Given that, with [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t], any evidence of Fred swimming is
evidence of swimming for the interval, to interpret that the utterance refers
to the event being witnessed you would have to add a presupposition to that
effect. That makes the interpretation of the utterance  Fred swims as a pro-
gressive more costly.
To put the two perspectives in terms of OT tableaux:
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(14) Tableau for Case 2
The point of view of the speaker starts from an interpretation and
finds the expression which is less costly passing through the BeStrong square.
Optimality is indicated by ‘➳’. The point of view of the hearer starts from the
linguistic form and finds an interpretation passing through the AvoidAccom-
modation square. Optimality is indicated by ‘☞’. Each view checks that
there is no alternative expression that satisfies the other view and ranks
higher than it according to Blutner’s definition of weak optimality in (11).
The asterisks ‘*’ indicate the more costly option in relation to the other,
given the interpretation. So, as an example, the speaker wanting to convey
habituality prefers Fred swims since it is less costly with respect to BeS-
trong and because the alternative expression is more costly from the hearer’s
perspective too (upon hearing Fred is swimming while witnessing the event
he would have to accommodate the presupposition that it is not the witnes-
sed event which is being talked about). The hearer prefers to intepret Fred
swims as a habitual because although they have the same cost from her/his
perspective, (s)he assumes the speaker is making the strongest statement
possible relative to the condition introduced in the DRS by the expression,
thus progressive would be weaker than habitual.
Now for Case 3, where the Agents have extra assumptions. As in
the other Cases, Fred swims says that somewhere within an arbitrarily long
interval which includes the utterance time there was one piece of evidence of
swimming by Fred that serves as support for a generalisation of the beha-
viour throughout the interval. Suppose speaker A with the assumption that
Fred had never swum in his life. By seeing him swim it is verified that Fred
has the ability to swim. So for this case the competing sentences are:  Fred
swims and Fred can/knows how to swim. The latter sentence will thus come
out less costly.
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Suppose now the hearer B, who knows that A had assumed until
now that Fred could not swim, hears A utter Fred swims. To interpret it as a
habitual B would have to either: (a) assume – contrary the initial hypothesis
for this case – that A had no negative assumptions about Fred’s swimming
abilities; (b) assume that A held contradictory assumptions about Fred, such
as that Fred had and had not swum. Both cases involve accommodating
presuppositions to arrive at the interpretation. But at hearing Fred swims
the habitual interpretation is stronger: it accounts for the fact that the hearer
will ‘reason’ that the speaker revised his assumptions not only about Fred’s
ability to swim, but changed his mind about Fred not having swum before.
Now suppose B hears A utter Fred can/knows how to swim. In
that case the fact that they know extra-linguistically (they see) that Fred is
swimming is evidence for the ability, so no accommodation is necessary, the
presupposition is bound extra-linguistically. On the speaker’s perspective
the ability reading is also stronger because it describes the explicit context
more fully.
(15) Tableau 2
This section has shown how conditions [n ⊂ t; e ⊆ t] and the
bidirectional OT framework can be made to capture the habitual use of sim-
ple present.
CONCLUSION
This paper argued for a non-reportive approach to present tenses
which integrates semantics and pragmatics. By dealing with core cases still
in a programmatic\ way, it argues for changes in central assumptions about
the semantics of verbs.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theory of the semantics and pragmatics
of present tenses. In DRT, and throughout the literature in the
field, simple present tenses are treated reportively: they
introduce a condition saying that the time of utterance and
the interval for which the eventuality is claimed are identical.
That renders the correct interpretation for sentences where
the eventualities are states. In sentences where the eventuality
is an event, the habitual meaning of present tense has to be
captured by adverbial(-like) operators. I will argue for a non-
reportive treatment of simple present event sentences, where
the utterance time is a proper subpart of the interval the
eventuality is claimed for. The habitual and the sportscaster
values of present tenses will be rendered in the interaction of
the non-reportive condition with Gricean principles within an
OT Semantic framework.
Key-words: present tenses; (non)-reportive; semantics-
pragmatics interface.
RESUMO
Este artigo apresenta uma teoria para a semântica e pragmática
dos presentes simples. A DRT e a literatura em geral vêem os
presentes simples como “reportivos”: trazem para a
representação uma condição dizendo que o momento de fala e
o intervalo ao qual a eventuality se sobrepõem são idênticos.
Esse tratamento engendra a interpretação correta para sentenças
em que a eventuality é um estado. Em sentenças em que a
eventuality é um evento, a habitualidade como valor semântico
tem de ser capturada por operadores de natureza adverbial.  Eu
vou defender uma caracterização das sentenças com presentes
simples em que o momento de fala é um subconjunto do
intervalo ao qual a eventuality se sobrepõe. Valores semânticos
“não-reportivos” (i.e., disposicionais) e valores semânticos
reportivos (como o “estilo narrador esportivo”) serão
ocasionados pela interação da [n ⊂ t] introduzida pelo presente
simples com princípios griceanos modelados de acordo com a
semântica da teoria da optimalidalidade.
Palavras-chave: presente simples; (não)-semelfactivo; interface
semântica-pragmática.
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